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The federal government has a long history of helping small businesses gain 
access to the mainstream American economy.  One way the government 
achieves this goal is by awarding government contracts to small businesses.  
Congress mandated that a “fair proportion” of government contracts should be 
placed with small businesses.1  The President establishes annual government-
wide goals for small business contracting, which Congress said “shall be no less 
than [twenty-three] percent of the total value” of prime federal contracts.2  
Specialized contracting programs authorized by Congress help government 
agencies meet these small business contracting goals.3 
The Department of Defense (DOD) awards contracts to businesses that 
support our military—an industry referred to as defense contracting.4  Given the 
recent drawdowns in our military forces, many of the jobs traditionally 
performed by military members have been outsourced to small businesses.5  
Troop transportation, equipment manufacturing and maintenance, security, and 
logistics support are just a few examples of the work performed by small 
businesses.6 
The “8(a) program,” named after Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 
permits the government to award certain contracts exclusively to small 
businesses that are certified as socially and economically disadvantaged.7  There 
is a presumption that members of designated racial groups are socially 
disadvantaged.8  As such, the government is permitted to award contracts to a 
pool of minority-owned businesses to the exclusion of non-minority-owned 
businesses. 
The 8(a) program is an affirmative action program that remains politically 
controversial and legally unresolved because non-minority contractors continue 
to wage successful Equal Protection challenges against the program.9  The 
                                                 
 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012). 
 2. See § 644(g)(1)(a)(i). 
 3. See JOHN CIBINIC ET AL., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1571–73 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 4. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RES. SERV., R43074, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE 
OF CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES 
FOR CONGRESS 1 (2013) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, USE OF CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY 
OPERATIONS]. 
 5. See id. But see KATE M. MANUEL & ERICA K. LUNDER, CONG. RES. SERV., R42390, 
FEDERAL CONTRACTING AND SUBCONTRACTING WITH SMALL BUSINESS: ISSUES IN THE 112TH 
CONGRESS 26 (2013) (describing recent attempts by the DOD to save money by insourcing work 
that had been traditionally outsourced to contractors). 
 6. See SCHWARTZ, USE OF CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 
4, at i. 
 7. See Small Business Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 8. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2016). 
 9. See DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 290, 292 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(finding that the 8(a) program is facially constitutional, but unconstitutional as applied to the 
2017] Affirmative Action in Military Contracting 747 
government has defended the program on remedial grounds, and has argued that 
the program eliminates barriers to business development created by past 
discrimination.10  However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent endorsement 
of the diversity rationale in higher education, the time is ripe to consider non-
remedial justifications for the 8(a) program.  This article argues that the diversity 
rationale justifies the use of affirmative action in defense contracting—an 
argument that has not been adequately explored by scholars or the courts. 
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia examined the 
constitutionality of the 8(a) program in DynaLantic v. United States Department 
of Defense.11  DynaLantic involved a U.S. Navy contract for the development of 
flight simulators for the “Huey” helicopter; a contract that the Navy determined 
it would award through the 8(a) program.  DynaLantic, a non-8(a) firm, 
challenged the award, “claim[ing] it would have competed for th[e] procurement 
but for” the Navy’s decision to award the contract through the 8(a) program.12  
The District Court found the program constitutional on its face, but 
unconstitutional as applied to the military training simulator industry.13  The 
court applied a strict scrutiny standard, and found that the government did not 
present evidence of discrimination in the military training industry sufficient to 
support race-based remedial action.14 
Though DynaLantic’s holding is limited to the “military simulator and 
training industry,” the case has far-reaching consequences.15  Under 
DynaLantic’s reasoning, the government must produce evidence of 
                                                 
military training simulator industry); Cortez III Serv. Corp. v. NASA, 950 F. Supp. 357, 361–62 
(D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the 8(a) program is facially constitutional, but unconstitutional as 
applied to the relevant industries because the agency lacked evidence of discrimination in the 
particular industries at issue).  But see Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 57, 63 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016) (affirming the decision of the D.C. District Court denying a business’ facial challenge 
to the 8(a) program after reviewing the program under rational basis scrutiny because the statute in 
question lacked a racial classifications and other circumstances that would warrant a stricter level 
of scrutiny). 
 10. See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 251. 
 11. See id. at 242. 
 12. See id. at 246–47. 
 13. See id. at 293. 
 14. See id. at 250, 280. 
 15. See id. at 247.  As of a fiscal year 2015 General Services Administration report, the DOD 
had over 52,404 8(a) contract actions in various stages of performance. See GEN. SERV. ADMIN., 
SMALL BUSINESS GOALING REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015, https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_ 
cms/index.php/en/reports/63-small-business-goaling-report.html.  When the DynaLantic decision 
was announced, the Under Secretary of Defense immediately suspended all future 8(a) contact 
awards for military simulator and service contracts.  See Memorandum from Richard Ginman, 
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, to Secretaries of the Military Departments 
et al. (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA004988-12-DPAP.pdf.  
He further directed the military services to consult with their attorneys regarding issues related to 
individual contracts.  Id.  The Air Force undertook significant efforts to ensure its current 8(a) 
simulator contracts were not exposed to liability. 
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discrimination in the hundreds of industries that it awards contracts to satisfy 
strict scrutiny.16  For example, to award 8(a) contracts in the transportation 
industry, including air, rail, and water, the government must have evidence of 
discrimination in those industries.17  Contract awards in other industries, from 
waste management to health care and social services, all require the same 
requisite evidence.18  If the government fails to meet its evidentiary burden in 
any of these markets, it risks exposure to Equal Protection challenges.  While 
the program remains constitutional on its face, the risk of as-applied challenges 
stalled its use in particular industries, reduced its overall effectiveness, and made 
it only a marginal tool for meeting small business contracting goals.19 
This precarious situation is due in part to the DOD’s failure to look beyond 
remedial justifications for the 8(a) program.  The DOD has consistently argued 
that the goal of the program is to remove barriers to minority business 
development “created by discrimination and its lingering effects.”20  However, 
a new war-labor paradigm that co-mingles military services and civilian 
contracts demands that the military maintain diversity across both the military 
and defense contracting communities.21  The way we fight wars has changed 
dramatically in recent decades.22  The reduction in military personnel demands 
a greater reliance on contractors.23  Today, contractors and military members 
work in close proximity on and off the battlefield.  By fostering diversity in the 
military contracting industry, the 8(a) program helps maintain a level of private 
                                                 
 16. See generally NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart=2012.   The 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the federal government’s standardized 
system for classifying business industries. 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. See Memorandum from Richard Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, to Department of Defense Acquisition Executives (Mar. 14, 2014),http://www.acq.osd.mi 
l/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA000970-14-DPAP.pdf; see also CONG. RES. SERV., R42981, SET-
ASIDES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES 32 (2016). 
 20. DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 251 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 21. See Michael H. LeRoy, The New Wages of War—Devaluing Death and Injury: 
Conceptualizing Duty and Employment in Combat Zones, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 218 
(2011). 
 22. See id. at 217–18. 
 23. See Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, in PARAMETERS 78–79 (2008) 
(arguing contractor fatalities matter because increased government outsourcing has led to an 
increased reliance on contractors as opposed to military personnel in our country’s war efforts).  
Steven L. Schooner is Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program at the George 
Washington University Law School and the Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Contract 
Law.  His publications on government contractor fatalities include: Steven L. Schooner & Collin 
D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice, SERV. CONTRACTOR 16 (2010) [hereinafter 
Schooner & Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice]; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, 
Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 6 
J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 11, 13 (2012) [hereinafter Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors]. 
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sector heterogeneity that is in line with diversity in the military forces.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that a racially integrated military is a matter of 
national security.24  Thus, our national security objectives are dependent on 
minority representation in the military, which unquestionably includes defense 
contractors who support our military. 
The government never articulated a non-remedial justification for the 8(a) 
program in court, though the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) suggested the 
strategy.25  The Supreme Court has accepted diversity as a compelling interest 
in other cases, but never considered the question in the context of government 
contracting.26  Given the Supreme Court’s recent endorsement of the diversity 
rationale, and the military’s renewed focus on diversity as a military strategy, 
the diversity rationale should be considered for the 8(a) program. 
This article is divided into three parts.  Part I provides an overview of the 8(a) 
program and constitutional challenges that have been raised against the program.  
Part II explains the current legal framework for affirmative action in government 
contracting.  Part III examines the extent and importance of diversity in the 
military and defense contracting communities, and juxtaposes affirmative action 
in contracting and higher education.  The article demonstrates that the benefits 
that flow from diversity across the total force of active duty members, reservists, 
and contractors, are critical to national security.  The Supreme Court has upheld 
the diversity rationale for affirmative action in the context of higher education, 
and this rationale applies equally in the military context.  Accordingly, the 8(a) 
program should be upheld against future constitutional challenges under the 
diversity rationale. 
                                                 
 24. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). 
 25. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, 
to General Counsels, Dep’t of Justice (June 28, 1995), http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/ 
OP/html/aa/ap-b.html.  The DOJ suggested non-remedial justifications for affirmative action in the 
aftermath of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena as promoting racial diversity and inclusion.  Id.  
The 8(a) program has not implemented many of the recommendations in the DOJ memo, 
presumably because government officials maintain that Adarand Constructors, Inc. does not apply 
to the 8(a) program. 
 26. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) 
(stating that there is a compelling government interest in diversity because diversity enables 
universities to better prepare students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society); Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 328, 331 (agreeing with military officials that having competent and diverse armed 
forces is essential for national security). 
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I.  OVERVIEW OF THE 8(A) PROGRAM 
A.  History of the 8(a) Program 
The movement toward equality in government contracting began in the 1940s, 
spurred by the nation’s transition to a wartime economy.27  African-Americans 
faced discrimination throughout the economy, including in public and private 
job sectors supporting the war effort, as well as in the segregated U.S. military.28  
In the spring of 1941, African-American leaders organized one of the first 
“march on Washington” demonstrations to protest segregation in the armed 
forces, and to advocate for equal employment in defense contracting.29  In 
response to the threat of civil disobedience on the capitol, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt used his executive order authority to establish the first Fair 
Employment Practice Committee (FEPC).30  The FEPC was charged with 
enforcing President Roosevelt’s mandate to eradicate discrimination in 
government contracting.31  While the FEPC lasted only five years, committee 
chairs made significant progress, settling nearly 5,000 discrimination 
                                                 
 27. See RUTH P. MORGAN, THE PRESIDENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS: POLICY-MAKING BY 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 37 (1970). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id.  The African American civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph, President of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, is credited with the idea for a march on Washington.  Id.  The 
March-on-Washington Committee (MOWC), which Randolph chaired, was responsible for many 
of the gains by African Americans in desegregating the armed forces and providing equal working 
opportunities in the defense industry.  Id.; see also March on Washington Movement, 
BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/march-washington-movement-1941-1947 (last 
visited Jun. 12, 2015). 
 30. See MORGAN, supra note 27, at 38.  On June 18, 1941, Roosevelt met with Randolph and 
other civil rights leaders to convince them not to hold the march.  Id.  Randolph wanted an executive 
order prohibiting discrimination in defense contracting, but Roosevelt feared such an order would 
upset Southern conservatives.  Id.  Roosevelt eventually conceded, issuing an executive order, and 
civil rights leaders cancelled the march.  Id.  The order established the Fair Employment Practice 
Committee (FEPC), a body that addressed grievances and complaints of discrimination in violation 
of the order.  Id.  President Roosevelt’s FEPC was terminated on June 30, 1946, under President 
Truman, who pursued his own fair employment initiatives.  Id. at 41. 
 31. See Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 25, 1941).  The order mandated that 
all defense-related contracts contain language prohibiting discriminating on the basis of “race, 
creed, color, or national origin.”  Id.  It also stated a nondiscrimination policy for the defense 
industry, and directed departments and agencies to take measures to ensure equal hiring.  Id.  Two 
years later President Roosevelt expanded the order to cover all government contracts.  See Exec. 
Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7,183 (May 29, 1943).  In 1948, President Harry S. Truman ordered 
the desegregation of the U.S. military through executive order.  See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. 
Reg. 4,313 (July 26, 1948).  Later, President Richard M. Nixon established the Office of Minority 
Business Enterprise (OMBE), the first federal agency dedicated exclusively to minority businesses.  
See Exec. Order No. 11458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4,937 (Mar. 5, 1969). 
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complaints.32  The FEPC’s work eventually gave rise to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, established in 1964, which is still in existence today.33 
As historic as these efforts were, racial inequality remained rampant in the 
U.S. and reached a boiling point in the 1960’s.  Between 1963 and 1967, race 
became the preeminent issue in a number of major U.S cities.34  In 1968, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson established a commission to study the etiology of 
the racial disturbances.35  The Kerner Commission conducted a broad range of 
studies and investigations and concluded the nation was “moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”36  The Commission 
urged the creation of programs designed to “encourage integration of substantial 
numbers of Negroes into the society outside the ghetto.”37 
Reacting to the study, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon 
implemented programs under the authority of Section 8(a) of the Small Business 
Act of 1958 intended to spur minority business growth and incentivize 
businesses to relocate to urban areas.38  Authority for small business contracting 
had existed since 1958, but the Small Business Administration (SBA) was 
                                                 
 32. See Morgan, supra note 27, at 51. 
 33. Id. at 57. 
 34. See, e.g., Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Movement 1954-1985, PBS (Aug. 23, 
2006), [hereinafter Eyes on the Prize].  In 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr., gave his “I Have a Dream” 
speech at the march on Washington.  See id.  The following year, President Johnson signed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See id. In 1965, protesters in Alabama marched from Selma to 
Montgomery, Alabama demonstrating for voting equality.  See id. 
 35. See Exec. Order 11365, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,111 (July 29, 1967). 
 36. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073 
NCJRS.pdf. 
 37. Id. at 10. 
 38. See Major Thomas Jefferson Hasty, III, Minority Business Enterprise Development and 
the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Program: Past, Present, and (Is There A) Future?, 145 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(c) (1973); 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(6) (1970).  
Under the authority of the Small Business Act, President Johnson initiated the President Test Cities 
Program, a program that offered contracts to small businesses, regardless of race, that moved to 
urban areas and hired the unemployed.  Hasty, supra, at 12.  President Johnson’s program was 
principally a training program and relied heavily on the Departments of Labor and Commerce to 
provide training grants to companies hiring and training unemployed minorities.  See id. at 11–12.  
President Nixon took a more direct approach to assisting minorities, establishing the Office of 
Minority Business Enterprise and directing the SBA to devote its resources specifically to minority 
businesses.  Id. at 13–14.  Under Nixon’s direction, the SBA promulgated race-specific regulations 
limiting certain contracts to “disadvantaged persons,” including “Black Americans, American 
Indians, Spanish-Americans, Oriental Americans, Eskimos and Aleuts.”  See 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-
1(c) (1973); Hasty, supra, at 14; Nixon called for increased representation of small businesses in 
federal departments and agencies, encouraged government contractors to subcontract with minority 
small businesses, authorized OMBE to provide technical assistance to minority businesses, and 
called on the Secretary of Commerce to promote minority business development.  See Hasty, supra 
note 38, at 13–14. 
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hesitant to focus the 8(a) program on minority small businesses because the 
statute authorized the SBA to contract with “all” small business firms, not 
minority firms exclusively.39 
In 1972, Congress responded to the Kerner Commission by undertaking a 
massive study examining minority business development in the U.S.40  Between 
1972 and 1978, Congress issued four reports that examined the obstacles to 
minority business development.41  Based on research by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the 
reports disclosed staggering statistics on the disparities between minority and 
other business owners in the U.S.42  Census data showed that minorities, who 
accounted for approximately seventeen percent of the U.S. population, owned 
only 4.3 percent of U.S. businesses.43  Moreover, minority-owned businesses 
had gross operating receipts of less than 0.7 percent of the total receipts reported 
for all businesses.44  Despite the opportunities for minority-owned businesses in 
construction at the state and local level, Congress found that minority-owned 
businesses received a disproportionately smaller number of these contracts.45  
Based on the reports, Congress concluded that until all people have the same 
economic opportunities, “remedial action must be considered as a necessary and 
proper accommodation for our Nation’s socially or economically disadvantaged 
persons.”46  In 1978, Congress amended the Small Business Act and provided 
the SBA with clear statutory authority to limit participation in the 8(a) program 
to socially and economically disadvantaged businesses.47 
                                                 
 39. See id. at 10–11; see also Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2012)). 
 40. See DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 253 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 41. See id. at 253–55; see generally S. REP. NO. 95-1070 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1791 
(1977); H.R. REP. NO. 94-468 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1615 (1972).  Congressional reviews found 
President Nixon’s minority small business program subpar.  Although the program was effective 
in directing contracts to minority businesses, it was ineffective in long-term business development, 
with an initial report from the GAO describing the program’s impact on business self-sufficiency 
as minimal.  See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 255.  In fairness to the SBA, most of the GAO’s 
criticism was attributed to a lack of resources supporting the program.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-
468, at 12 (1975).  The GAO also blamed program failures on the SBA’s inability to control the 
supply of government contracts awarded to small businesses, mismanagement of small business 
mentors, lack of management and training for participants, and Congress’s failure to provide 
statutory authority for the program.  H.R. REP. NO. 92-1615, at 5 (1972). 
 42. See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 254–57. 
 43. Id. at 253. 
 44. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-1615, at 3. 
 45. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MINORITIES AND WOMEN AS GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTORS 122 (1975). 
 46. See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-468, at 1–2 (1975)). 
 47. See Small Business Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (1978). 
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B.  Framework of Small Business Contracting Programs 
Congress has authorized a number of programs that facilitate contracting with 
specialized classes of small business (see Figure 1), such as Women-Owned 
Small Businesses and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses.48  
All of these programs are race-neutral except for the Small Disadvantaged 
Business (SDB) program and the 8(a) program.49  Notably, only the 8(a) 
program reserves contracts exclusively for socially and economically 
disadvantaged businesses.50  This feature makes the 8(a) program a target for 
Equal Protection lawsuits.51 
                                                 
 48. See CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 3, at 1599.  The special classes of small businesses include 
Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone), Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small 
Business (SDVOSB), Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB), and Small Disadvantaged 
Business (SDB) concerns.  See Government Contracting Programs, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov/contracting/government-contracting-programs (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2017).  The 8(a) program has unique statutory authority to carry out its goal of 
developing minority businesses, and is one of two programs authorized to use race-conscious 
admissions criteria to select its participants.  Contracting officers use a variety of contracting 
“preferences” to award contracts to small businesses, including (1) set-asides; (2) sole source 
awards; (3) evaluation preferences; and (4) subcontracting programs.  See CIBINIC ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 1590, 1956.  Set-asides and sole-source awards offer advantages to minority businesses 
by limiting the number of participants in the competitive pool.  See id. at 1035, 1590.  Evaluation 
preferences give minority businesses a “plus” factor in competitions with large businesses, while 
subcontracting programs offer monetary incentives to prime contactors that subcontract with 
minority businesses.  See id. at 1596.  These preferences are used to assist small businesses that are 
often competing with larger and more established firms. 
 49. All 8(a) firms fall under the SDB program, but not all firms in the SDB program are 8(a) 
firms.  See Disadvantaged Businesses, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/ 
contracting/government-contracting-programs/small-disadvantaged-businesses (last visited Apr. 
28, 2017). 
 50. See CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 3, at 1601 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4)). After Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Under Secretary for Defense directed the SDB program to 
discontinue set-asides to socially disadvantaged business.  See infra note 105 and accompanying 
text.  Two other programs, the “Price Evaluation Program” and the “Participation Program,” were 
struck down in Rothe Dev., Corp. v. Department of Defense.  See Rothe Dev., Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Def., 545 F.3d. 1023, 1027–28, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The Participation Program was 
incorporated into the overall incentive subcontracting program at FAR Part 19.7.  See, e.g., FAR 
19.706 (2017).  As a result, the 8(a) program is the only stand-alone SDB program that offers 
contracts exclusively to minority-owned small businesses. 
 51. Race-neutral small business programs, such as the Women-Owned Small Business 
program, have not created as much controversy as the 8(a) program, likely because of the lower 
level of judicial scrutiny that courts apply in race-neutral challenges.  See Y. Lisa Colon Heron & 
Brian Anthony Williams, Government Contracting Preference Programs After Schuette: What’s 
Next? Achieving Parity Through Race-Neutral Methods, THE CONSTR. LAWYER 29, 35 (2015).  
Also, race-neutral programs are in parity with each other, meaning that businesses in these 
categories can compete with each other for contracts.  See id. at 35–36; CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 
3, at 1599–1600.   In contrast, the 8(a) program is a stand-alone program, and only 8(a) firms can 
be awarded 8(a) contracts.  See Heron & Williams, supra, at 30. 
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Figure 1 
The 8(a) program authorizes the SBA to enter into contracts with federal 
agencies and to perform those contracts by subcontracting with socially and 
economically disadvantaged small businesses.52  Socially and economically 
disadvantaged small businesses are defined as businesses that are at least fifty-
one percent owned and operated by one or more socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals.53  Socially disadvantaged individuals are defined as 
“those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias 
because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their 
individual qualities.”54 
Statutorily recognized socially disadvantaged groups include, among other 
minorities, “Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Indian 
                                                 
 52. See CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 3, at 1603.  The contractual relationship between the 
parties in the 8(a) program is unique.  See id. at 1607.  The SBA contracts with procuring federal 
agencies, and subcontracts with SDBs to provide the goods or services.  See id. at 1606.  
Administration of the contract is allocated to the procuring agency.  See id. at 1606–07.  Once the 
contract is awarded, the procuring agency stands in the shoes of the SBA, conducts business directly 
with the minority businesses, and can even terminate the contract without SBA approval.  See id. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
 54. § 637(a)(5).  In 1981, Congress expanded the scope of the 8(a) program to include entity-
owned small businesses.  JOHN R. LUCKEY & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SER., R40744, 
THE “8(A) PROGRAM” FOR SMALL BUSINESSES OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE SOCIALLY AND 
ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES 6 (2012).  The first entity-
owned small businesses were Community Development Corporations, non-profit groups serving 
their local communities.  Id.  Alaska Native Corporations and Indian tribes were added in 1986, 
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tribes, Asian Pacific Americans, [and] Native Hawaiian Organizations.”55  
Individuals who are not members of one of the designated groups may establish 
individual social disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence.56 
Economically disadvantaged individuals are defined as those “whose ability 
to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished 
capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area 
who are not socially disadvantaged.”57  The burden of proving economic 
disadvantage is on individual participants who must submit personal financial 
information and a narrative statement describing their economic disadvantage.58 
C.  Benefits of the 8(a) Program 
Despite criticism that the 8(a) program is simply a mechanism to steer 
contracts to minority businesses, the program provides a variety of assistance.59  
Participating 8(a) firms can receive financial, technical, and contract 
management support.60  Firms can also receive business planning, loan 
packaging, accounting and bookkeeping, marketing, and financing support.61  In 
2012, the SBA spent over $3 million providing training, counseling, and 
                                                 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(1)(C).  Some of these broad groups are further divided into subgroups.  
For instance, Asian Pacific Americans include “persons with origins from Burma, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Laos, 
Cambodia (Kampuchea), Vietnam, Korea, The Philippines, U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands (Republic of Palau), Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Samoa, Macao, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, or Nauru,” and Subcontinent Asian Americans include “persons with origins from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives Islands or Nepal.”  See 13 C.F.R. § 
124.103(b)(1) (2016). 
 56. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(c) (“Evidence of individual social disadvantage must include . . 
. [(1)] At least one objective distinguishing feature that has contributed to social disadvantage . . . ; 
[(2)] Personal experiences of substantial and chronic social disadvantage in American society, not 
in other countries; and [(3)] Negative impact on entry into or advancement in the business world 
because of the disadvantage. . . .”). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A).  Economic disadvantage is based on income, assets, and 
personal net worth, an amount which must be less than $250,000 upon acceptance into the 8(a) 
program, and less than $750,000 after admission to the program.  See 13 C.F.R. § 124.104(a), (c). 
 58. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.104(b). 
 59. See Helaman S. Hancock, America’s War on Tribal Economies: Federal Attacks on 
Native Contracting in the SBA 8(a) Business Development Program, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 717, 722 
(2010) (discussing congressional skepticism about large contract awards to Alaskan Native 
Corporations without competition). 
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(7)(A). 
 61. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(10)(A)(i)–(iii).  Most 8(a) participants, because of their economic 
disadvantages, are eligible to receive loans through two needs-based companion programs, the 7(a) 
Loan Program, and the Certified Development Company/504 Loan Program.  See Office of 
Financial Assistance: Resources, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/ 
offices/headquarters/ofa/resources/4049 (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). As of 2012, loans to 8(a) 
businesses under these programs totaled nearly $50 million.  Id. 
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marketing assistance to socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.62  
The program also offers mentorship through its Mentor-Protégé Program, a 
partnering effort that enables larger non-8(a) firms to act as mentors to protégé 
8(a) firms.63  Mentorship includes providing technical, managerial, and financial 
assistance, as well as participating in teaming arrangements to compete for, and 
perform on, federal contracts.64 
Indeed, the 8(a) program is a comprehensive development program that 
provides extraordinary access to the federal contracting system.  The 8(a) 
industry generates about $16 billion in revenue and has more than 7,390 
participating businesses.65  Between 2008 and 2011, the 8(a) program graduated 
1,938 firms,66 or an average of 646 firms a year, and provided jobs for about 
72,408 employees.67  Of those firms, 1,713 were still actively doing business in 
2012.68 
There is a wide representation of underrepresented groups within the 8(a) 
program. In 2012, women-owned firms accounted for thirty-two percent of all 
8(a) firms.69  For the same year, the ethnic categories of the individual firm 
owners included Black American (32.5 %), Hispanic American (22.3 %), Asian 
Pacific American (11.4 %), Subcontinent Asian American (10.5 %), Native 
                                                 
 62. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, FY 2012 408 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 14 (2012) [hereinafter FY 2012 408 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS].  The 
FY 2012 report is the most recently published report. 
 63. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.520. 
 64. See Mentor-Protégé Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/ 
contracting/government-contracting-programs/8a-business-development-program/mentor-
protege-program (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
 65. See FY 2012 408 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 62, at 5.  Most participating 
businesses generate their revenue from a mix of government and private contracts, with 8(a) sales 
accounting for about fourty-eight percent of their total revenue.  Id. at 21. 
 66. See id. at 15–17.  The development period for minority firms in the program is limited to 
nine years, after which time firms “graduate” and can no longer participate in the program.  See 
SBA 8 (a) Fact Sheet, NANA DEV. CORP., http://nana-dev.com/news_and_press/media_ 
kits/sba_8__a__fact_sheet/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
 67. See FY 2012 408 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 62, at 15.  Entity-owned 8(a) 
businesses, owned by groups of minorities, often provide valuable employee benefits such as 
employee education reimbursements, college preparatory classes, internship programs, and drug 
and alcohol treatment programs.  Id. at 19.  These firms have helped establish community family 
crisis centers and after-school summer programs and provide housing for elders, individuals, and 
families.  Id.  In 2012, entity-owned 8(a) firms provided an estimated $183.7 million in benefits to 
their local communities.  Id.  The four entity-owned 8(a) firms, including Alaskan Native 
Corporations (ANCs), Tribally Owned, Native Hawaiian Organizations, and Community 
Development Corporations, are required to provide annual spending reports to Congress.  Id. 
 68. See id. at 15.  Firms may become non-active due to various reasons, such as economic 
conditions, mergers, retirement, illness, death of owner, or pursuit of other interests by the owner.  
Id. 
 69. See id. at 19.  Men-owned firms accounted for roughly sixty-three percent of all 8(a) firms, 
and about five percent of the firms did not list a gender.  Id. 
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American (8.5 %), Caucasian American (2.1 %), Native Hawaiian American 
(0.2 %), and Other American (12.5 %).70 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTING 
Affirmative action contracting programs have been controversial since their 
inception.71  Not surprisingly, the scope of these programs has been largely 
shaped by litigation that challenged the programs over the last two decades.72  
This section provides a brief background of the litigation, and examines the more 
recent decisions in Rothe and DynaLantic that articulate and apply the current 
standards.  This section will also discuss the impact of recent decisions on the 
8(a) program and identify unresolved questions raised by those decisions. 
A.  Early Challenges to Affirmative Action Contracting Programs 
Two Supreme Court cases that dramatically shaped the Equal Protection law 
of affirmative action in government contracting are City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Company73 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.74  Since 1980, the 
Supreme Court has struggled with the application of strict scrutiny to race-
conscious federal, state, and local contracting programs.75  The test, as 
articulated in Adarand, is whether the government can demonstrate a compelling 
government interest to justify the use of racial classifications, and whether race-
conscious measures are narrowly tailored to further that interest.76   
1.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company (1989) 
Croson focused on the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny 
analysis.  In Croson, the Court considered the constitutionality of a city 
ordinance that required prime contractors to subcontract thirty percent of their 
work to minority-owned businesses.77  The City of Richmond, Virginia passed 
the ordinance in 1983 because, while the general population of Richmond was 
fifty percent African-American, only 0.67% of the city’s prime construction 
contracts had been awarded to minority-owned businesses between 1978 and 
                                                 
 70. See id. at 18. 
 71. See CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 3, at 1600 (discussing Equal Protection challenges to 
affirmative action programs by non-minority businesses). 
 72. See infra Part II. A–B. 
 73. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (Croson), 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 74. Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 75. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980).  In Fullilove, the Court applied an 
ambiguous standard that clearly was not strict scrutiny, and upheld a congressional spending 
program mandating that ten percent of federal funds for public works projects go to local minority 
businesses.  See id. at 473, 490–92. 
 76. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227. 
 77. See Cronson, 488 U.S. at 477. 
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1983.78  The city’s business associations, who had virtually no minority 
businesses in their membership, opposed the ordinance, and argued that although 
the statistics were disparaging, there was no evidence of discrimination by the 
City of Richmond.79  After its passage, the ordinance was quickly challenged by 
J.A. Croson, a company that bid on a city contract for the provision and 
installation of urinals and water closets in the city jail.80  The U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the ordinance, and the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed.81  Both courts relied on Supreme Court precedent that afforded 
deference to Congress’ findings of past discrimination in the construction 
industry, and held that Richmond’s action was reasonable.82 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  Justice O’Connor explained that the city of 
Richmond did not hold the same remedial power as Congress.83  She noted that 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a positive grant of legislative power 
to Congress, while Section 1 is an explicit restraint on state power stemming 
from a distrust of state legislative enactments based on race.84  While Congress 
has broad remedial authority to enforce Equal Protection guarantees, state and 
local governments must make specific findings of discrimination to engage in 
race-remediation.85 
Justice O’Connor relied on Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a decision 
the Court issued two terms prior.86  In Wygant, the Court held that a school board 
policy extending minority employees protection from layoffs was 
unconstitutional because the board lacked a “strong basis in evidence” for its 
conclusion that remedial action was necessary.87  Applying Wygant, Justice 
O’Connor found that the city of Richmond had not presented the Court with 
specific instances of racial discrimination in the city’s contracting industry, and 
thus lacked a strong basis in evidence to demonstrate a compelling interest.88  
She reiterated, “an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a 
particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.”89 
                                                 
 78. See id. at 479–80. 
 79. See id. at 480. 
 80. See id. at 481. 
 81. See id. at 483–84 (citing J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 
1985), vacated, J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986)). 
 82. See id. at 484. 
 83. See id. at 488, 490. 
 84. See id. at 490–91 (citing U.S. CONST. amend XIV) (“The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article…. Nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 85. See id. at 491–92. 
 86. See id. at 492 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). 
 87. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277–78. 
 88. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. 
 89. Id. at 499. 
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The decision suggested a bifurcated standard of review for federal and state 
affirmative action contracting programs. Federally administered programs were 
treated to a watered-down form of strict scrutiny, as courts afforded deference 
to congressional and agency findings of discrimination.90  In contrast, state and 
local programs were held to more exacting strict scrutiny.91  The Supreme Court 
later had an opportunity to address the standard of review for federal programs 
in a seminal affirmative action case that reviewed the constitutionality of 8(a) 
and other federal contracting programs.92 
2.  Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995) 
Adarand dramatically changed the affirmative action landscape because it 
unequivocally held that strict scrutiny applies to all federal affirmative action 
contracting programs. Adarand did not reverse previous affirmative action 
contracting cases.93  Rather, it shifted the Court’s compelling interest analysis 
away from affording deference to Congress in federal contracting cases, and 
closer to the exacting form of strict scrutiny applied to state and local 
programs.94  After Adarand, courts looked to Croson for guidance to apply the 
compelling interest analysis under strict scrutiny to affirmative action 
contracting programs.95  Croson’s “strong basis in evidence” test became a 
guidepost for courts reviewing such programs. 
Adarand involved a federal statute that granted monetary incentives to prime 
contractors who employed minority businesses to perform a portion of their 
contracts.96  The prime contractor in the case solicited offers from small business 
subcontractors for a Colorado federal highway project, and selected a minority-
owned subcontractor over a non-minority-owned subcontractor because of the 
incentives.97  The prime contractor submitted an affidavit that stated, but for the 
incentive program, he would have subcontracted with the lower priced non-
minority-owned business.98 
Justice O’Connor methodically analyzed and retreated from a number of 
considerations that the Court had formerly reserved for federal programs, such 
                                                 
 90. See id. at 484. 
 91. See id. at 490–93. 
 92. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 207 (1995). 
 93. See id. at 235. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Rothe Dev. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 107 F. Supp. 3d 183, 208 (D.D.C. 2015); 
DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp 237, 251 (D.D.C. 2012); Cortez III Serv. 
Corp. v. NASA, 950 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 96. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 208 (citing the Surface Transportation and 
Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987)). 
 97. See id. at 205. 
 98. See id. 
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as deference to Congress and benign racial classifications.99  The end result was 
the Court’s adoption of a uniform strict scrutiny standard of review for federal, 
state, and local affirmative action programs.100  Unfortunately, by remanding the 
case, the Court offered no insight into how to apply the standard.101  While the 
bright-line rule brought consistency to the Court’s jurisprudence, the pivot 
wreaked havoc for courts and the procurement system. 
On remand, the lower courts struggled to apply the test announced in 
Adarand.102  The Colorado District Court granted summary judgment for the 
subcontractor, holding that the affirmative action program failed to satisfy strict 
scrutiny.103  The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that evidence of discrimination 
supported the government’s remedial action.104  Government officials were 
similarly perplexed. In the wake of Adarand, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology suspended all set-aside programs for Small 
Disadvantaged Businesses.105  The 8(a) program was spared because it was a 
separately authorized program, and its authorizing statute was not directly 
implicated in Adarand.106  However, contractors quickly challenged the 8(a) 
program, arguing that its authorizing statute could not withstand strict scrutiny 
under Croson and Adarand.107 
                                                 
 99. See id. at 213–14. Justice O’Connor engaged in an exhaustive review of equal protection 
cases examining the Court’s interpretation of the differences in language of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id. She concluded that the Court’s fractured affirmative action cases had three 
general propositions in common.  First, any preference based on race must receive a “most 
searching examination.”  Id. at 219.  Second, the standard of review must not depend on the race 
of the person burdened or benefited.  Id. at 226–27.  Third, for congruence, equal protection analysis 
must be the same under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 231–32.  Justice O’Connor 
derived from these three propositions the principle that both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
protect persons, not groups.  Id. at 227.   She concluded that all governmental action based on race 
must be subject to strict scrutiny to ensure that the personal right to equal protection is not infringed.  
Id. 
 100. See id. at 227, 231–32. 
 101. See id. at 238–39 (“The question whether any of the ways in which the Government uses 
subcontractor compensation clauses can survive strict scrutiny, and any relevance distinctions such 
as these may have to that question, should be addressed in the first instance by the lower courts.”). 
 102. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(reversing the lower court’s decision after a lengthy review of strict scrutiny jurisprudence). 
 103. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1584 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 104. See Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1188. The Supreme Court dismissed a second writ of certiorari 
as improvidently granted. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).  Thus, the 
Tenth Circuit decision upholding the program is controlling. 
 105. See Memorandum from Paul G. Kaminski, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, Department of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Oct. 23, 1995), 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/reghtml/changes/afac/afa92_50.htm. 
 106. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 209–10 (1995). 
 107. See Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 107 F. Supp. 3d 183, 190–92 (D.D.C. 2015), 
aff’d sub nom., Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 2016); DynaLantic 
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a.  The Current Standard: Rothe and DynaLantic 
In 2008, the SBA offered three affirmative action programs that exclusively 
assisted minority-owned businesses. These included the 8(a) program, 
Participation Program, and Price Evaluation Adjustment (PEA) Program.108  The 
Participation and PEA programs were struck down in Rothe Development, Corp. 
v. United States Department of Defense.109  As such, the 8(a) program is the only 
remaining program congressionally authorized to exclusively assist minority-
owned businesses.110 
i.  Rothe Development Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense 
(2008) 
In Rothe, the Federal Circuit provided a detailed analysis of the application of 
strict scrutiny to the SDB programs under Adarand. At issue in Rothe was the 
constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 2323, the authorizing statute for the Participation 
Program and PEA Program.111  Both programs offered exclusive benefits to 
minority-owned businesses. The Participation Program permitted the 
government to evaluate prime contractors’ proposals based in part on their plans 
to subcontract with minority-owned businesses.112  If a prime contractor’s 
proposal included a plan that called for SDBs to perform a portion of the work, 
the government could give extra credit to that contractor’s proposal.113  While 
                                                 
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp. 2d 237, 276–77 (D.D.C. 2012); Cortez III Serv. Corp. v. 
NASA, 950 F. Supp. 357, 361–62 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 108. See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1027–29 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 109. See id. at 1050. 
 110. After Adarand, the 8(a) program was one of three remaining programs exclusively serving 
minority-owned businesses. See id. at 1027–29. The other two programs were the “Participation 
Program” and the “Price Evaluation Adjustment (PEA) Program.”  Id.  Government officials 
attempted to shield these programs from the Adarand fallout, but their efforts were preempted. In 
1998, Congress passed legislation suspending the PEA Program.  Id. at 1029 n.2. Section 801 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 amended 10 U.S.C. § 2323, the programs’ 
implementing statute, by mandating suspension of the programs if the DOD met its five percent 
SDB contracting goal in the previous year.  Id. at 1028 (citing Strom Thurmond National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1999, Pub. L. 105-261, 112 Stat. 2080, 2081 (1998)). The DOD met its 
goal that year, and in every subsequent year, until the Federal Circuit struck down both programs 
in 2009.  See id. at 1050 (holding that both programs authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2323 violated 
equal protection and were unconstitutional). The 8(a) program is the only remaining affirmative 
action program congressionally authorized to exclusively assist minority-owned businesses. See 
Contracting: Mentor-Protégé Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (last visited Mar. 4, 2017), 
https://www.sba.gov/contracting/government-contracting-programs/8a-business-development-
program/mentor-protege-program. 
 111. Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1035–36; see National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
99-661, 100 Stat. 3859, 3973 (1986). 
 112. See FAR 19.1202.3 (2012). 
 113. See FAR 19.1203 (2012).  Plans were evaluated based on a number of factors, including 
proposed percentage targets for the amount of small business participation, and detailed 
descriptions of how the targets would be achieved.  FAR 19.1202-4 (2012).  The government 
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the subcontracting plan was only one factor in the source selection evaluation, it 
offered a significant advantage to prime contractors utilizing SDBs, especially 
in close competitions.114 
The PEA Program provided price adjustments to SDBs competing against 
non-minority contractors in source selection competitions.115  Under this 
program, SDBs were granted a ten percent price adjustment in competitions 
when the SBA determined that SDBs were underrepresented in the industry.116 
For example, if the SBA determined that minorities were underrepresented in 
the construction industry, the government could adjust the offerors’ prices so 
that proposals submitted by non-minority businesses would reflect a ten percent 
price increase over an SDB’s price. 
The Federal Circuit held that 10 U.S.C. § 2323, the authorizing statue for both 
programs, violated Equal Protection.117  The court said that the Croson “strong 
basis in evidence” test was the appropriate test to analyze the government’s 
compelling interest under strict scrutiny.118  Applying Croson, the court found 
that the government’s six state and local disparity studies did not provide a 
probative and broad-based statistical foundation to satisfy the test.119  In 
particular, the Court found that the government’s proposed benchmark analysis, 
a formula that the government used to calculate the share of contracts that 
minorities would have received without discrimination, did not account for 
whether minority-owned businesses were qualified, willing, and able to perform 
the contracts.120  The Court held that defects in the studies, in addition to their 
                                                 
selected contracts based on the strength of the subcontracting plan, among other evaluation factors.  
Id. 
 114. See FAR 19.1203. Contracting officers were authorized to incentivize contractors who 
surpassed their subcontracting goals. The incentives ranged from zero to ten percent of the dollars 
in excess of plan goals.  See Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1027.  After Rothe, the government incorporated 
the Participation Program into the overall incentive subcontracting program, which supports all 
small businesses, including SDBs.  See FAR 19.703 (2012). 
 115. See Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1027. 
 116. See id. at 1027–30. 
 117. See id. at 1050 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 118. See id. at 1036. 
 119. See id. at 1047. The court found that the government’s disparity studies did not account 
for the relative size differences of minority firms.  Id. This, the court said, rendered the studies less 
probative because it was impossible to know the relative capacities of the businesses, and whether 
larger businesses, though fewer, could handle more volume.  Id.  The court further found the studies 
lacked probative value because of their limited geographical coverage, representing only one state 
and six local municipalities.  Id. at 1045–46. 
 120. See Id. at 1037, 1041–42. The benchmark analysis was the government’s response to 
Adarand, and was supposed to be a defense to a Croson challenge.  Id. at 1049. Its purpose was to 
ensure that the programs were only used in industries with underrepresented minorities.  Id. at 
1041–42. After Adarand, the Department of Commerce (DOC) was tasked with using disparity 
studies to determine benchmarks that would guide officials when determining whether racial 
disparities in each industry were so significant as to warrant affirmative action measures. Id. at 
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limited geographic coverage, rendered them insufficient to satisfy the Croson 
“strong basis in evidence” test.121  As such, the government failed to demonstrate 
a compelling interest under strict scrutiny that justified the use of race-conscious 
measures. 
ii.  DynaLantic Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense (2012) 
DynaLantic was not the first time the D.C. District Court considered the 
constitutionality of the 8(a) program. In 1996, the court ruled the program 
unconstitutional as applied to a NASA contract because the government did not 
present evidence of discrimination in the industry in which the contract would 
be performed.122  The NASA contract proposed a range of agency services, 
including transportation, property disposal, and video production.123  The court 
noted that the same DOJ that represented the government in the current litigation 
issued a memorandum, after Adarand, advising the DOD that it must have a 
strong basis in evidence before engaging in race-conscious remedial action.124 
In DynaLantic, the D.C. District Court reached the same conclusion on a DOD 
contract for military simulators that raised similar issues.125  In this case, the 
Navy awarded an 8(a) contract to buy military flight simulators for the “Huey” 
helicopter.126  DynaLantic, a non-8(a) manufacturer of flight simulators, brought 
suit alleging that the 8(a) program was unconstitutional on its face and as applied 
to the military simulation and training industry.127  The court denied 
DynaLantic’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case on 
standing grounds.128  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit granted DynaLantic’s motion 
                                                 
1029 n.2. However, the DOC never followed through with its benchmark analysis, presumably 
because Congress suspended the PEA Program in 1998.  See id.  Without this analysis in Rothe, 
the government was forced to rely on one state and five local disparity studies to defend the 
programs.  Id. at 1038. 
 121. See id. at 1045. In dicta, the court suggested that DOC’s benchmark analyses would have 
at least allowed the court to determine whether the programs met the Croson standard.  Id. at 1049. 
In fact, the court stated that the initial DOC studies were exactly the type of “true capacity studies” 
that were needed to account for various sizes of businesses, a critical factor in determining 
utilization of minority-owned firms.  Id. at 1044. 
 122. See DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp 237, 247, 282 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 123. Id. at 282–83 (citing Cortez III Serv. Corp v. NASA, 950 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C. 
1996)). 
 124. See Cortez III, 950 F. Supp. at 361–62 (citing Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, to General Counsels, Dep’t of Justice (June 28, 1995), 
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/ap-b.html. 
 125. See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 281, 292. 
 126. See id. at 247. 
 127. Id. at 242. DynaLantic initially challenged a separate DOD program that obligated the 
DOD to participate in the 8(a) program. Id.  However, the court ruled that the challenge was moot 
after the DOD program was found unconstitutional in Rothe.  Id. 
 128. See id. at 247 (citing DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 937 F. Supp 1, 5 (D.D.C. 
1996)). The D.C. District Court found that because DynaLantic did not seek participation in the 
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to enjoin the procurement during the pendency of the appeal.129  Shortly after 
this ruling, the Navy cancelled the contract.130 
Despite the cancelled contract, the D.C. Circuit held that DynaLantic had 
standing to challenge the 8(a) program because the program prevented 
DynaLantic from competing for future contracts.131  On remand, the D.C. 
District Court denied DynaLantic’s facial challenge, but upheld the as-applied 
challenge.132  The court found that the DOD, by its own admission, did not 
produce any evidence of discrimination in the military simulation and training 
industry.133  The court explained, “the government cannot simply rely on broad 
expressions of purpose or general allegations of historical or societal racism. 
Rather, its legislation must rest on evidence at least approaching a prima facie 
case of discrimination in the relevant industries.”134  Without this evidence, the 
DOD could not demonstrate a compelling interest in remedying discrimination 
in this industry.135  DynaLantic appealed the denied facial challenge, but the 
parties entered into a settlement agreement before the D.C. Circuit reached the 
merits of the case.136 
B.  Impact of the Current Standard and Unresolved Questions 
Rothe and DynaLantic make clear that the 8(a) program carries significant 
litigation risk, particularly in markets where the government has no statistical 
evidence of discrimination. The cases also make clear that the government will 
not be afforded deference under the compelling interest prong of the strict 
scrutiny analysis in as-applied challenges to the program. 
                                                 
8(a) program, the firm lacked standing because it would not be directly affected by the outcome of 
the litigation.  DynaLantic, 937 F. Supp at 5–6. 
 129. See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 247. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. The D.C. Circuit also invited DynaLantic to file an amended complaint in order to 
raise a facial challenge to the authorizing statute, in addition to their as-applied challenge.  Id. 
 132. See id. at 293. The government presented evidence of discrimination in the construction, 
architecture, engineering, and professional services industries. Id. at 273–74. The court found that 
the evidence, which spanned multiple decades and represented various regions of the country, was 
sufficient for Congress to authorize a nationwide remedy.  Id.  The ultimate burden for the facial 
challenge rested with the plaintiffs to show that Congress lacked a strong basis in evidence to 
conclude that there is any set of circumstances in which it was necessary or appropriate to set aside 
contracts for the program.  Id. at 274. The court held that DynaLantic had not done so, and ruled 
for the government on the facial challenge.  Id. at 274, 279–80. 
 133. See id. at 280. 
 134. See id. at 281. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Memorandum from Richard Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, to DOD acquisition executives (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy 
/policyvault/USA000970-14-DPAP.pdfhttp://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA000 
970-14-DPAP.pdf. 
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In contrast, courts will afford some deference on facial challenges. For 
example, the DynaLantic court did not require evidence of discrimination in all 
fifty states in order to deny the facial challenge to the 8(a) program.137  However, 
both the Rothe and DynaLantic courts were unwilling to allow the government 
to operate the facially valid program in individual markets based on the evidence 
the government presented on the facial challenge.138 
While courts are wary of affording deference to the government’s decision to 
employ race-conscious measures to remedy past discrimination, they are less 
wary when the government offers a non-remedial purpose. The Supreme Court 
has recognized the diversity rationale as a non-remedial purpose that may justify 
race-conscious measures, a rationale that the government has articulated in a 
variety of contexts. 
For instance, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission,139 the Supreme Court deferred to the FCC’s expertise on the issue 
of whether minority ownership of licenses actually promoted programming 
diversity.140  The Court said, “[t]he FCC’s conclusion that there is an empirical 
nexus between minority ownership and broadcasting diversity is a product of its 
expertise, and we accord its judgment deference.”141  Likewise, in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke,142 the Court held that the attainment of a 
diverse student body was clearly a compelling interest in the context of a 
university’s admissions program.143  The Court did not require the university to 
present evidence of discrimination at its school or any other school. Rather, it 
deferred to the university regarding whether a diverse student body was essential 
to the quality of higher education.144  Most recently, in Fisher v. University of 
                                                 
 137. See DynaLantic, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 274 n.13 (“We do not think that Congress needs to 
have evidence before it of discrimination in all fifty states in order to justify a nationwide program. 
Contrarily, evidence of a few isolated instances of discrimination would be insufficient to uphold 
the nationwide program.”) (citing Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 262 F.3d 1306, 1329–
30 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 138. See id. at 293; see also Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1050 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 139. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 140. See Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 593–594. Adarand overruled Metro Broadcasting, but 
only to the extent that Metro Broadcasting did not comport with the Court’s ruling that all racial 
classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny.  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“Accordingly, 
we hold today that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny . . . .  To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is 
overruled.”). 
 141. See id. at 569. 
 142. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 143. See id. at 311–12 (finding that a university’s pursuit of a diverse student body is an act of 
“[a]cademic freedom, [which] though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has 
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”). 
 144. See id. at 312. 
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Texas at Austin (Fisher II), the Supreme Court examined the appropriate level 
of deference courts should afford universities when, examining under strict 
scrutiny, universities claim that diversity would advance their educational 
goals.145  The Court concluded that a university’s determination that diversity 
has educational value is an academic judgment to which some deference is 
owed.146 
In the aftermath of Adarand, the DOJ contemplated the application of non-
remedial justifications for government contracting programs. The DOJ 
recognized that the Supreme Court never addressed the question, and advised 
agency general counsel to consider the rationale for federal contracting 
programs.147  However, 8(a) program officials ignored the advice and continued 
to articulate remedial justifications for the program; they believed that Croson 
and Adarand did not apply to the 8(a) program.148  More than twenty years after 
Adarand, the legal framework for affirmative action is substantially more 
developed.  Last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed diversity in higher 
education as a compelling government interest.149  Thus, the application of the 
diversity rationale in other affirmative action contexts is again ripe for 
consideration. 
III. THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN MILITARY 
CONTRACTING 
This section is divided into three parts.  Section A examines the diversity 
rationale in the context of the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence 
in higher education.  Section B explains how the diversity rationale applies in 
other contexts.  Lastly, Section C applies the rationale to the military contracting 
context. 
                                                 
 145. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016). In 
Fisher I, the Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case. See Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013). On re-hearing, the Court 
affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 146. See id. at 2207–08. 
 147. See Walter Dellinger, Memorandum to General Counsels Regarding Adarand, at 1 (June 
28, 1995), http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/ap-b.html; Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, to General Counsels, Dep’t of Justice (June 
28, 2016), http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/ap-b.html. 
 148. See DynaLantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 885 F. Supp. 2d, 237, 280 (D.D.C. 2012). 
The government argued that Section 8(a) was a minority development program, not an affirmative 
action program, and therefore evidence of discrimination in specific industries was not 
constitutionally required.  Id. 
 149. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210. 
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A.  The Legal Framework for Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
The argument that diversity in government contracting is a compelling interest 
is grounded in higher education affirmative action case law. For almost four 
decades, the Supreme Court has deliberated the constitutionality of affirmative 
action in higher education. In June 2016, by a four-to-three vote, the Supreme 
Court upheld the affirmative action admission program at issue in Fisher II.150  
The decision placed affirmative action on its strongest footing since the Court 
first considered the issue in University of California v. Bakke.151 
In Bakke, the Court considered an admissions program at the Medical School 
of the University of California at Davis.152  The university had reserved sixteen 
admission seats for minorities and eighty-four seats for white applicants.153  
Bakke was a white student who was denied entry despite having an overall 
higher admission score than minority students who were admitted through the 
minority program.154  The Court held that racial distinctions of any sort require 
“the most exacting judicial examination” regardless of the program’s 
purportedly benign purpose.155  The Court stated that the university must show: 
(1) “that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and 
substantial”; and (2) “that the use of racial classifications is necessary to achieve 
its purpose.”156 
The university advanced four purposes for the program: “(i) reducing the 
historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools . . . (ii) 
countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of 
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) 
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student 
body.”157  The Court dispensed with all but the last justification because the 
Court never approved racial classifications in the “absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations.”158  The Court added that, “in the absence of legislative mandates and 
legislatively determined criteria,” universities were in no position to make such 
                                                 
 150. See id. at 2207, 2215.  The decision surprised analysts, many of whom believed the Court 
would strike down the program after granting certiorari to hear the case a second time. See Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-will-reconsider-affirmative-action-
case.html?_r=0. 
 151. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 152. See id. at 269–70. 
 153. See id. at 289. 
 154. See id. at 277 (“[A]pplicants were admitted under the special program with grade point 
averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke’s.”). 
 155. See id. at 291. 
 156. Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973) (footnotes omitted)). 
 157. Id. at 306 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 158. See id. at 307. 
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findings and could not be permitted to rely on amorphous claims of societal 
discrimination to justify a race-conscious admissions program aimed at 
remedying past discrimination.159 
Turning to the non-remedial purpose, Justice Powell found that the attainment 
of educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body was a permissible 
goal.160  As he explained, courts have long recognized academic freedom as a 
special concern of the First Amendment.161  Universities must be free to make 
decisions concerning “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.”162  The university’s First 
Amendment right to select the students who, in the university’s opinion, will 
most likely contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas,” is of paramount 
importance to its mission.163 
Finding that a diverse student body was a permissible and substantial interest, 
Powell turned to the necessity prong of the analysis and stated that the 
complexity of the interest did not require the rigid quota system at issue in the 
case.164  He explained that diversity is a concept that encompasses a “broader 
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but 
a single though important element.”165  He concluded that race may be 
considered a “plus” in an applicant’s file, but may not be used to insulate an 
individual from competition with other applicants.166  No other judge joined 
Justice Powell in the part of the opinion discussing the diversity justification.167  
Subsequently, courts were not sure how to apply the precedent until Justice 
O’Connor addressed the issue again in Grutter v. Bollinger. 168 
In Grutter, the Court considered the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions program that included race as a factor, but 
that did not reserve seats or have quotas for minority applicants.169  Justice 
O’Connor dispelled the notion that racial classifications are reserved for 
remedial settings.170  Relying on Justice Powell’s First Amendment rationale, 
                                                 
 159. See id. at 309–10 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 96 (1976)). 
 160. Id. at 311–12. 
 161. Id. at 312. 
 162. Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 163. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
 164. See id. at 315. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 317. 
 167. See id. at 267. 
 168. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 169. Id. at 315–16. 
 170. Id. at 328. 
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she found that diversity was a compelling government interest.171  She described 
the benefits that can be achieved through diversity as “not theoretical but real,” 
and listed cross-cultural understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, and 
creating livelier classroom discussion as among the benefits.172 
A contingent of amici curiae petitioners filed briefs that discussed the tangible 
benefits of diversity in the military and corporate America.173  Military leaders 
asserted that a “highly qualified racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to 
the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national 
security.”174  They described the racial tension that existed in the enlisted and 
officer corps during Vietnam, and the breakdown of unit cohesion that ultimately 
led to failed missions.175  Major businesses including 3M, Microsoft, General 
Motors, American Airlines, General Dynamics, and Coco-Cola stressed the 
importance of diversity to multinational companies.176  They argued that 
universities, as feeder pools to their companies, contributed to the development 
of diverse and eclectic employees who understand the global marketplace and 
who regularly practice cross-cultural competencies for the benefit of the 
company.177 
Finding the arguments persuasive, the Court moved their attention to the 
narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.  The Court identified 
several factors to consider.  First, a narrowly tailored program cannot use a quota 
system, but may consider race or ethnicity as a “plus,” without insulating 
applicants from comparisons with other applicants.178  Race or ethnicity cannot 
be the defining feature of an applicant, and race-neutral means cannot be 
available to achieve the government’s stated purpose.179  Finally, the effects of 
the program on non-minorities must be considered, as well as limitations on the 
                                                 
 171. Id. at 329. 
 172. Id. at 330. 
 173. See Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516); Motion for Leave to File 
Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Exxon Mobil Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516); Motion for Leave to File 
Brief Amicus Curiae Out of Time and Brief of MTV Networks in Support of Respondents, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516). 
 174. Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516). 
 175. See id. at 5–6. 
 176. See generally Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516). 
 177. See Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516). 
 178. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (comparing U.C. Davis Medical School’s quota in Bakke 
to Harvard’s more flexible use of race as a “plus” factor). 
 179. See id. at 337. 
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duration of the program.180  The Court held that the law school admissions 
program satisfied these narrow tailoring requirements.181 
In Gratz v. Bollinger,182  a case decided the same day as Grutter, the Court 
struck down Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program on narrow tailoring 
grounds.183  The undergraduate admissions program automatically awarded 
twenty points, or one-fifth of the points needed for admission, to every minority 
applicant.184  Following Grutter, the Court said that automatically awarding 
points to minority applicants did not provide for the individualized consideration 
that is required of a narrowly tailored race-conscious program.185 
The most recent case to examine affirmative action in higher education is 
Fisher II.  The central issue in Fisher II was whether the Fifth Circuit correctly 
applied strict scrutiny when reviewing the University of Texas at Austin (UT) 
undergraduate admissions program.186  The case involved an affirmative action 
plan at UT that granted admission to the top graduates from every high school 
in the state.187  The “Top Ten Percent Plan,” as it is known, is a race-neutral 
admissions program that was successful in recruiting minorities because of the 
de facto segregation of the Texas high school system.188  The program accounted 
for seventy-five percent of the university’s undergraduate admissions, while the 
other twenty-five percent of students were admitted through a race-conscious 
program that considered race as a factor in its admission criteria.189  It is the race-
conscious program that was at issue in Fisher II. 
In Fisher I, the Supreme Court found that the Fifth Circuit improperly applied 
strict scrutiny when it erroneously granted deference to UT under the narrow 
tailoring prong of the test.190  In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, 
under Grutter, “the narrow tailoring inquiry—like the compelling interest 
inquiry—is undertaken with a degree of deference to the Universit[y].”191  
                                                 
 180. See id. at 341–42 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must 
not “unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.”). 
 181. See id. at 343. 
 182. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 183. See id. at 275. 
 184. See id. at 256. 
 185. See id. at 271. 
 186. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016). 
 187. See id. at 2205–07. 
 188. See id. at 2205–06; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Fisher v. University of Texas: Who Put 
the Holes in “Holistic”?, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 36 (2013) (“The Top Ten Percent 
Law was in a curious sense both race-neutral and race-based. On its surface it was entirely race-
neutral, creating a reward for any student finishing in the top ten percent of his or her class. Yet 
race was indisputably the animating purpose behind the law.”). 
 189. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 190. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–21 (2013). 
 191. Id. at 2420 (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), remanded to 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
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Because it applied the wrong legal standard, the Supreme Court found that the 
Fifth Circuit did not carefully consider the narrow tailoring factors in Grutter, 
deferring too much to UT’s “serious, good faith consideration” of race-neutral 
alternatives.192  This, the Supreme Court said, confined the strict scrutiny 
analysis and did not permit the court to give “close analysis to the evidence of 
how the process works in practice.”193 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit applied the correct legal standard and again 
upheld the program.194  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fisher II, 
legal experts thought that the decision signaled the end of affirmative action in 
higher education.195  However, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, 
finding that the court correctly applied strict scrutiny in upholding the program 
a second time.196  Fisher argued that the plan was unnecessary because UT 
already achieved a “critical mass” of minorities by 2003 through the Top Ten 
Percent Plan, which had been in effect since 1998.197  The university disagreed, 
arguing that it conducted a year-long study on diversity, including holding 
retreats, conducting interviews, and reviewing data after the Grutter and Gratz 
decisions in 2003.198  University officials drafted a thirty-nine-page analysis 
considering the use of race-neutral alternatives, which concluded that the Top 
10 Percent Program alone was not sufficient to achieve a critical mass of 
minority students.199 
                                                 
 192. See id. at 2420–21. The Fifth Circuit’s error is not totally misguided. In Grutter, the Court 
said that narrow tailoring does not require an exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative. Rather, it requires a “serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives that 
will achieve the diversity the university seeks.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. The Fifth Circuit adopted 
its “good faith” standard based on the language in Grutter. See Fisher, 631 F. 3d at 231. 
 193. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s 
assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close 
analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.”). 
 194. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016) (holding that the program satisfied Grutter because it did not have a quota, was 
sufficiently flexible, and because there were no workable race-neutral alternatives). 
 195. See, e.g., Eric Levitz, The Supreme Court May Be on the Verge of Ending Affirmative 
Action, MSNBC (June 29, 2015, 6:50 PM).  Levitz stated: 
The Supreme Court will very likely end affirmative action at UT Austin, and may 
even end affirmative action at all public universities. The trouble for the policy’s 
supporters is twofold. First, it took Sandra Day O’Connor joining the court’s four 
liberals to uphold Bakke in 2003. Since then, O’Connor has been replaced by the far 
more conservative Samuel Alito. Second, the court’s liberal quartet will be 
shorthanded for Fisher; Elena Kagan has been forced to recuse herself because of her 
involvement with the Fisher case back when she was solicitor general. 
Id. 
 196. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2213–15 (2016). 
 197. See id. at 2211. 
 198. See id. at 2211–12. 
 199. See id. at 2212. 
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The Court found UT’s evidence persuasive. Between 1996 and 2002, the 
university had experienced “consistent stagnation” in minority demographics.200  
In 1996, UT enrolled 266 African-American freshmen, about the same number 
as UT enrolled in 2003.201  In 2002, fifty-two percent of undergraduate classes 
had no African-American representation, and twenty-seven percent had one 
African-American student.202  The Court found that UT’s conclusion that race-
neutral alternatives were not successful at achieving diversity was reasonable.203 
Fisher also argued that the program was not necessary because its impact was 
minimal in advancing UT’s compelling interest.204 The Court compared 
diversity statistics before and after the enactment of the program and found that 
the consideration of race had a “meaningful, if still limited” impact on achieving 
UT’s interests.205 The Court stated that the relatively minor impact of the 
program was “a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of 
unconstitutionality.”206 
B.  The Diversity Rationale Outside the Context of Higher Education 
Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and Fisher II clearly established that diversity in higher 
education is a compelling government interest. Importantly, the Court has 
accepted the diversity justification outside the context of higher education.  In 
Metro Broadcasting¸ the Court upheld an affirmative action program 
implemented by the FCC aimed at increasing diversity on the radio.207  The case 
put the diversity question squarely before the Court, and did so outside the 
context of higher education. 
At issue in Metro Broadcasting were two minority preference programs 
authorized by Congress under the Communications Act of 1934.208  The 
programs permitted the FCC to grant broadcasting licenses to minority-owned 
businesses for the purpose of increasing diversity in the broadcasting industry.209  
The programs offered separate avenues for minority businesses to obtain the 
licenses.  Under the “enhancement” program, the FCC gave special 
                                                 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id.  In 2003, UT enrolled 267 African-American students, a paltry increase of one 
student from 1996.  Id. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600–01 (1990). 
 208. See id. at 552–53. 
 209. Id. at 553–54; see also Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).  The Act 
was amended in 1996 to specify that a purpose of the Act is to make available service to all the 
people of the United States “without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, or sex.”  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (2012). 
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consideration to minority businesses that applied for new licenses.210  The 
“distress sale” program transferred licenses from broadcasters facing license 
revocation to minority businesses, a practice that was otherwise prohibited by 
FCC policy.211 
The Court held both programs were constitutional.212  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Brennan considered whether the FCC’s objective of promoting racial 
diversity on the airwaves was an important government interest.213  He noted 
that Congress explicitly mandated that the FCC maintain its minority policies 
while the case was pending before the D.C. Circuit.214  Citing Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, an earlier affirmative action decision by the Court that placed 
considerable significance on congressional deference, Justice Brennan stated 
that when Congress explicitly directs an administrative agency to adopt a benign 
racial classification, the Court is “bound to approach [its] task with appropriate 
deference to the Congress. . . .”215  Invoking Justice Powell’s First Amendment 
rationale in Bakke, Justice Brennan compared the radio to the classroom, stating, 
“[j]ust as a diverse student body contribut[es] to a robust exchange of ideas . . . 
the diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves important First 
Amendment values.”216 
The precedential significance of Metro Broadcasting was diminished by 
Adarand, but only to the extent Metro Broadcasting did not apply strict scrutiny.  
In writing the Adarand opinion, Justice O’Connor was careful to leave the 
diversity rationale intact by overruling Metro Broadcasting only “to the extent 
that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with [this] holding.”217 
Supreme Court Justices have contemplated the use of non-remedial 
justifications in a variety of contexts.  In her concurring opinion in Wygant, a 
case examining school board protections against minority layoffs, Justice 
O’Connor stated that there might be government interests other than diversity in 
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higher education and remedying past discrimination that are compelling.218  She 
suggested that promoting racial diversity among the faculty in primary and 
secondary schools might be considered a compelling government interest.219  
Dissenting in Wygant, Justice Stevens opined that a police superintendent might 
reasonably conclude that an integrated police force might do a more effective 
job of maintaining law and order in a city with a history of racial unrest than an 
all-white force.220  He also stated that it may be appropriate for the government 
to consider race when selecting undercover agents to investigate crime rings 
involving members of the same race.221  In United States v. Paradise,222 a case 
involving a “one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement” in the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety, the Court upheld the interim promotion 
requirement for minority law enforcement officers.223  The Court considered 
arguments that race-based hiring in law enforcement “restores community trust 
in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitate[s] effective police service by 
encouraging citizen cooperation.”224  The Court found that the Department’s 
prior discriminatory policies justified remedial action, a finding that preempted 
a ruling on the diversity justification.225 
Notably, the Supreme Court has imposed limits on the diversity justification.  
In Bakke, the U.C. Davis Medical School argued that diversity would advance 
the goal of “improving the delivery of health-care services to communities 
currently underserved.”226  Justice Powell said the school did not present 
empirical data to suggest that “any one race is more selflessly socially oriented 
or by contrast that another is more selfishly acquisitive.”227  In Croson, a case 
involving a requirement for contractors to subcontract thirty percent of their 
work to minority-owned businesses, Justice O’Connor said that the goal of 
developing “role models” in the minority business community was not a 
sufficiently compelling interest to justify a minority subcontracting 
requirement.228 
Scholars examining the application of the doctrine outside the context of 
higher education view Grutter and subsequent affirmative action cases as a shift 
                                                 
 218. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(striking down a collective bargaining agreement between the school board and employee union 
granting protections against layoffs to minority employees). 
 219. See id. at 288. 
 220. See id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 221. See id. 
 222. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
 223. See id. at 153, 165–66. 
 224. See id. at 167 n.18. 
 225. See id. at 167. 
 226. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978). 
 227. Id. at 311. 
 228. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (Croson), 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989). 
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in the Court’s jurisprudence.229  Cynthia Estlund notes that Grutter’s shift from 
“backward-looking and inward-looking perspectives” about diversity in the 
classroom, to “forward-looking and outward-looking perspectives” about 
diversity in the workforce, lends credence to the doctrine’s application in the 
employment context.230  Nancy Leong argues that the application of strict 
scrutiny under Adarand made remedial affirmative action less likely to 
withstand constitutional muster.231 As a result, the justification for affirmative 
action shifted to diversity. She notes that although the Supreme Court has not 
expanded the doctrine beyond higher education, the Court has never foreclosed 
the possibility.232 
As Estlund states, the link between the diversity justification and the military 
has already been established.233 If the diversity justification carries any weight 
outside of higher education, it carries weight in the military context. The 
military’s mission is national defense—a compelling interest.234 The military 
has recognized the strategic value of diversity to its mission.235 Further, the 
military incorporated contractors into its ranks in unprecedented fashion.236 The 
8(a) program unquestionably increases diversity across the contracting force, 
which in turn helps the military accomplish its diversity goals. As such, the 
diversity rationale is apropos for justifying affirmative action in military 
contracting programs. 
C.  The Diversity Rationale and Military Contracting 
The diversity rationale for the 8(a) program rests on two fundamental 
attributes of our military. This section will explore those attributes, and then 
discuss their import to the diversity rationale for military contracting. The first 
attribute is that our defense contractors work more closely with the military 
today than at any other time in our nation’s history.237 In official documents, the 
military factors this relationship into its assessment of its “total force.”238 Total 
force refers to the active duty members, reservists, and contractors that make up 
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our military.239 In 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, “we 
should acknowledge that [operational contract support] is no longer a niche 
capability….Contractors are part of our total military forces.”240 Second, our 
military is diverse. This diversity is not merely cosmetic, but rather critical to 
mission success.241 The 8(a) program is a necessary tool in building diversity 
across the total force, particularly in the defense contracting community. The 
military has recognized this diversity as a military strategy, one that is necessary 
to accomplish its national security objectives.242 
1.  Contractor Integration is a Defining Feature of Modern Warfare 
The distinction between the military and government contractors has never 
been more blurred than in recent wars. Many of the jobs traditionally performed 
by military personnel are now outsourced.243 Today, the military relies on 
contractors to transport troops, build supply chains, maintain equipment, and 
build infrastructure in deployed locations.244 This new war-labor scheme 
requires “integrate[d] contractor support in all military operations.”245 
A few statistics are illustrative.  During a two-year period beginning in 2011, 
contractors and military personnel in Iraq were represented in nearly a one-to-
one ratio.246 In March 2011, there were 155,000 contractors and 145,000 military 
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.247 Between January and June of 2010, more 
contractors were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan than military personnel.248 Since 
2001, roughly three times as many contractor injuries have been reported than 
military injuries.249 In a nine-year period following 9/11, contractor deaths rose 
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from five percent of the death toll to over fifty percent.250 In all, about thirty 
percent of U.S. lives lost in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were contractors.251 
Remarkably, the combination of military members and contractors on the 
battlefield has become a hallmark of current military operations.252 
Responsibility for military personnel and contractors on the battlefield, or 
what the military refers to as “command authority,” is a duty of military 
commanders.253 Of course, contractors’ duties are governed by a host of 
authorities, including the relevant government contract, but in many cases 
contractors follow military orders just like soldiers.254 In fact, citing immunity 
doctrines, some courts have refused to hear lawsuits brought by soldiers’ 
families against contractors following military orders, as seen in one case where 
an Army soldier was killed in Iraq when a suicide bomber detonated explosives 
in a military dining facility owned, operated, and secured by Halliburton 
contractors.255 The soldier’s family sued Halliburton for negligence and 
premises liability, but the court declined to hear the case citing the Army Field 
Manual that stated that military commanders are responsible for the safety of 
contractors.256 After analyzing the factors relating to the political question 
doctrine, the court declined to hear the case, stating it could not make judgments 
about battlefield operations that are reserved for the Commander-in-Chief and 
the military.257 In another case, a contractor truck convoy hit and killed an Army 
soldier.258 The soldier’s parents sued Kellog Brown & Root for the negligence 
of its drivers. The court barred the suit because it found that the contractors were 
subject to military orders, rules, and convoy plans of the Army, and thus the 
political question doctrine was applicable to the military contractors in this 
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case.259 In both cases, soldiers’ suits against the military were barred under Feres 
v. United States,260 a case holding that the government is not liable under the 
Tort Claims Act for injuries to service members arising out of activities incident 
to military service.261 Thus, courts have recognized that contractors are not only 
integrated with the military, but that they often operate under the legal authority 
of the military, especially on the battlefield. 
Despite battlefield mishaps, there are a number of benefits to contractor 
integration. Contractors allow the military to sustain prolonged conflicts without 
exceeding military personnel limits imposed by Congress.262 As the military 
continues its reduction in forces, contractors increasingly make up for personnel 
losses.263 Contractors relieve military personnel of support duties, and allow the 
military to perform combat missions and other inherently governmental 
functions.264 Contractors supply and maintain an increasing cache of hi-tech 
equipment and can be deployed or re-deployed faster than military troops.265 
Contractors are similarly intertwined with service members in stateside 
missions.266 For example, contractors and military members work together in 
military maintenance depots that are government-owned and operated facilities 
located on military installations that provide for the maintenance and 
sustainment of weapon systems.267 Weapon systems include airplanes, missiles, 
satellites, and other major platforms.268 The military has increasingly relied on 
depot maintenance as battlefield equipment has become more advanced. 
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Between FY 2014 and FY 2016, contractors performed about fourty percent 
to fifty percent of military depot maintenance.269 Working in tandem with 
military personnel, they provide technical expertise and training to DOD 
personnel and continuity to the program when military personnel deploy or 
change duty stations.270  Though contractors do not fall under the military chain 
of command, they often report to a DOD supervisor who is responsible for the 
overall operation of the depot. 
The DOD coined the term “total force” to conceptualize the integration of all 
military personnel components.271 Much more than a signal of inclusiveness, 
total force is a military strategy that recognizes the nature of modern warfare.272 
2.  The Strategic Importance of Diversity in the Military 
The second attribute of the military that helps form the bedrock for the 
diversity rationale is that the military embraces diversity as a strategic goal.273 
Diversity has become a top priority for the military in the last decade, as seen in 
2009 when President Barack Obama established the congressional Military 
Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC),274 a commission tasked with 
evaluating and assessing DOD policies that “provide opportunities for the 
promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces.”275 
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According to the commission, the DOD policies aimed at achieving diversity 
have had a positive impact on the racial makeup of the military.276 
Approximately 32.9 percent of enlisted members and 22.5 percent of officers 
identify themselves as a minority, or about 31.1 percent of all active duty 
members.277 An additional twelve percent of active duty members identify 
themselves as Hispanic, which the DOD does not consider a minority race 
designation and tracks separately as an ethnicity.278 Compared to 1995, the 
military has seen an increase in racial diversity, up from 28.2 percent of enlisted 
members and 10.5 percent of officers.279 The reserve component has seen a 
decrease in the diversity of enlisted personnel but an increase in officers: 
approximately 26.6 percent of enlisted reserve members and 20.3 percent of 
officers identify themselves as a minority, up from 29.5 percent of enlisted 
reserve members and 14.6 percent of officers in 1995.280 In the active duty 
component, the ratio of officers to enlisted is about one to 6.8,281 and about one 
to 7.1 in the reserves.282 
Recently, the DOD has broadened its definition of diversity, garnering a more 
inclusive military culture.283 Since 2011, the DOD has overseen the rescission 
of the “combat exclusion policy” for women,284 the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” 
policy for gay men and women,285 and the Navy’s prohibition on women serving 
on submarines.286 The service branches have adopted more expansive definitions 
of diversity that cover language abilities, geographic backgrounds, personal life 
experiences, and socioeconomic backgrounds, in addition to race.287 
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The recognition of diversity as a military strategy has roots that predate the 
equal opportunity policies for minorities in the 50’s and 60’s.  As early as 1948, 
President Truman stated that desegregation in the military was not only fair, but 
that it was also necessary to maintain a more effective fighting force.288 In the 
last decade, the military has been more deliberate about linking diversity policy 
goals with strategic objectives.289 Not surprisingly, diversity has emerged as an 
important concept in operational adaptability, as the military seeks to capitalize 
on the rapidly changing American demographic and the specialized skills and 
competencies that troops require in overseas operations.290 
The military services have more recently sought to articulate the diversity 
strategy in policy documents. The Army identified six diversity strategic 
outcomes that are key to its success.  They are 1) leader commitment; 2) high 
quality diverse talent; 3) integrated diversity and leader development; 4) 
enhanced cultural competency; 5) expanded human dimension of leadership 
skills; and 6) Army-wide inclusive culture.291  
The outcomes are primarily based on three observations about military 
diversity.  First, diversity plays a critical role in recruitment and retention.292 A 
multicultural military that reflects the demographics of the country is perceived 
to be fair.  The recruitment and retention of talented leaders is dependent on the 
citizenry’s perception that the military is representative of the people it 
defends.293 Further, the current workforce expects and desires an inclusive 
environment, and may seek employment elsewhere if the military lags behind 
contemporary employers.294 Finally, diversity allows the military to recruit as 
many talented candidates from the largest possible pool, thus ensuring the 
solidity of the all-volunteer force.295 
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Second, a commander’s ability to maintain unit cohesion, or what the military 
calls “good order and discipline,” is dependent on a racially diverse military.296 
In Grutter v. Bollinger,297 twenty-nine high-ranking military veterans, including 
4-star generals, former military-academy superintendents, Secretaries of 
Defense, and members of the U.S. Senate filed an amicus brief describing the 
breakdown of unit cohesion and the chain of command during the Vietnam 
War.298 These leaders directly attributed the collapse in unit cohesion to the 
racial disparities in military units and acknowledged the impact of the 
breakdown of good order and discipline on the overall mission in Vietnam.299 
The brief cited a Washington Post article featuring Lieutenant General Frank 
Petersen, the first African-American Marine pilot and squadron commander in 
Vietnam. As Lt. Gen. Petersen recalled, 
In Vietnam, racial tensions reach[ed] a point where there was an 
inability to fight. . . .  We were pulling aircraft carriers off line because 
there was so much internal fighting.  There were murders, blacks 
banding in power groups.  The leader of the Mau-Maus was in my 
squadron.  Platoons that were [eighty] percent minority were being led 
by lieutenants from Yale who had never dealt with ghetto blacks.  
Soldiers were angry.  Martin Luther King was killed.  It all came 
together.  It was a mess.300 
Recent data on Air Force promotion rates suggests that racial tension in the 
military is still an issue.  In a 2016 interview, former Air Force Vice Chief of 
Staff, Larry Spencer, an African-American, revealed that every African-
American senior leader from whom he sought career advice said that they “had 
to work harder than their peers to get to the same point.”301  Minority promotion 
rates in the Air Force reflect that sentiment.  Data show that white airmen in all 
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grades have enjoyed higher promotion rates than minority airmen.302  Experts 
attribute this statistic to an overrepresentation of minorities in administrative and 
support assignments, which do not fare as well as more competitive positions—
such as pilot assignments—at promotion boards.303 
Despite an overall increase in minority representation in the military in the 
last couple of decades, the services have experienced a recent decline in African-
American representation.304  Today, about twenty percent of Army soldiers are 
African-American, compared to about twenty-seven percent in 1995.305  In the 
Navy, about seventeen percent of enlisted sailors are African-American, 
compared to twenty-one percent in 2005.306  And about ten percent of Marines 
are African-American, compared to twenty percent in 1985.307  Only one 
percent, or about eight of 753 Navy SEALs officers, are African-American.308  
The reason for the decline is not clear, but recent Army studies showed that 
African-American political leaders, teachers, and parents had expressed 
decreased support for military service.309  Other officials cited increased 
opportunities in the private sector as a reasons for the decrease in African-
American enlistment.310 
The third observation supporting the Army’s strategic outcomes is that the 
nature of modern warfare, and the specialized skills required to conduct 
operations around the world, are dependent on diversity.311  Global operations 
depend not only on people with specialized skills, such as linguists, but more 
broadly on the entire military’s ability to foster cross-cultural relationships.  A 
diverse military has great utility in conducting counter-terrorism operations, but 
is also better equipped to train foreign security forces, establish local rules, build 
courts, schools, hospitals, and engage in infrastructure stabilization.312  The 
military currently supports operations in the Middle-East, but its footprint is 
global with more than 800 bases in seventy countries and territories.313 
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The military defense contracting community has recognized the critical role 
diversity plays within the DOD, and has called for change within its industry.  
During the opening plenary session of the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics Science and Technology Forum, held on January 8, 2015, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Wesley Harris told the 
audience that “[i]mproving diversity in the aerospace community, and closing 
the existing educational achievement gap between whites and minorities would 
boost the American economy by $2.3 trillion dollars by 2050.”314  Noting that 
Latinos and African-Americans comprise twenty-seven percent of the U.S. 
population, but account for only nine percent of the STEM labor force, another 
leader argued that rectifying that discrepancy would “increase the power needed 
to promote economic growth.”315 
Although the military defense industry has made commitments to diversity 
and inclusion in the form of speeches and messages on corporate webpages, it is 
unclear whether the rhetoric has increased diversity representation.316  The 
industry does not publish annual diversity statistics or make any such studies 
readily available to the public.  Under federal law, individual firms are required 
to submit affirmative action plans to the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).317  However, the plans are not 
published.318  This lack of transparency makes it difficult to gauge the severity 
of the problem or to track industry progress in this area. 
3.  Diversity in Military Contracting is a Compelling Interest 
The Supreme Court has held that diversity in higher education is a compelling 
interest, in part, because of its First Amendment implications.319  In Bakke, the 
Court found that Academic Freedom had long been viewed as a “special 
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concern” of the First Amendment, and therefore universities could make their 
own judgments as to the selection of their students.320  Scholars have criticized 
Justice Powell’s “loose invocation of academic freedom as a basis for” diversity 
as a compelling interest.321  However, the Court has recognized two other 
rationales justifying affirmative action under Equal Protection, including 
national security and remediation of past discrimination.322 
In Haig v. Agee, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Secretary of State could 
revoke the passport of a former Central Intelligence Agency employee because 
he exposed agents’ identities while abroad.323  Weighing Agee’s First 
Amendment claims against the government’s national security interests, the 
Court emphatically stated that “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”324  
The Court has generally not expanded the national security rationale for Equal 
Protection, though on numerous occasions the Court has recognized that the 
military context is unique. 
For example, in Grutter, former DOD officials convincingly argued that 
diversity in the military is a matter of national security.325  Labeling the benefits 
of diversity in the military “not theoretical but real,” the Court cited to the former 
military leaders’ amici briefs, highlighting the importance of diversity in 
lessening racial tension and eliminating stereotypes that inhibit mission 
effectiveness.326 
In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,327 the Court 
examined the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, an Act that required 
the government to deny federal funding to institutions of higher education that 
refused to allow military recruiters on campus.328  The Roberts Court upheld the 
law, and recognized the authority of Congress “to provide for the common 
Defence, to raise and support Armies, and to provide and maintain a Navy.”329 
Noting that “Congress’ power in this area is broad and sweeping,”330  Justice 
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Roberts found that the incidental burden on speech was justified by the 
government’s interest in raising and supporting the Armed Forces.331 
Of course, the DOD cannot simply claim that a race-conscious contracting 
program impacts national security without offering a “reasoned, principled 
explanation.”332  There are several points to consider when linking contracting 
with national security.  First, the diversity justification applies only to defense 
contracting.  Contracts outside of the military context have no direct impact on 
national security.  Second, the 8(a) program unquestionably increases diversity 
across the defense contracting community.  The latest Small Business Goaling 
Report showed that 8(a) procurements accounted for $9.3 billion of DOD 
procurements.333  Third, the new war-labor scheme puts defense contractors and 
military personnel on the same operational battlefield.  Defense contractors 
augment military units, sometimes outnumbering them, and are often under the 
control of military commanders.334  If the DOD cannot increase diversity in the 
defense contracting community, their overall military objectives are at risk. 
Importantly, some amount of deference is owed to the DOD’s determination 
that diversity in military contracting is a compelling government interest.  In 
Grutter, the Court held that a university’s educational judgment that diversity is 
essential to its educational mission is one to which courts will defer.335  Fisher 
II did not abdicate this deference.336  Rather, it defined the parameters of 
deference by holding that universities should be granted “some, but not 
complete” judicial deference on issues that are integral to their mission.337  
While the Court shifted away from the broad deference it afforded in Grutter, 
the Fisher II Court focused its attention on the narrow tailoring prong of the 
strict scrutiny analysis.338  The Court stressed that no deference should be given 
to a university’s good-faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives, 
a construct that has nothing to do with diversity as a compelling interest.339 
It follows that the military should be afforded some deference regarding its 
conclusion that diversity in defense contracting is critical to national defense.  
There is some precedent for this deference in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  For 
more than a half-century, the Court has applied a military deference doctrine.340  
This doctrine requires that a court considering a constitutional question 
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involving military rules or regulations provide a more lenient standard of review 
than would be appropriate if the challenged legislation did not involve members 
of the military.341  The doctrine is potent but limited, applying only when there 
is a constitutional challenge to a military regulation that requires a weighing of 
the government’s interests.342 
Prior to the 1950’s, during its “noninterference” period, the Court’s practice 
was to deny jurisdiction in military cases, leaving such cases to the political 
branches.343  The Court altered its jurisprudence in the 1950’s, shortly after 
Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a uniform set 
of regulations governing the military branches.344  The Court was skeptical of 
the UCMJ, and ruled against the DOD in a number of cases involving the 
constitutionality of courts-martial practices involving civilians and non-service-
connected crimes.345  By the 1970’s, congressional amendments to the UCMJ 
had relieved the Court’s skepticism, and the Court began deferring to Congress 
and the President on military issues.346 
The Roberts Court continues to apply the military deference doctrine.  In 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., a case involving 
military recruiting on college campuses, the Court rejected a challenge to the 
Solomon Amendment, stating that “judicial deference . . . is at its apogee” when 
Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies.347  The trend 
suggests that the Court is willing to defer to the political branches’ estimation of 
the needs of the armed forces.348  If the Court was to decide the issue, it would 
likely have to consider the proper amount of deference it should afford to the 
DOD’s determination that diversity in military contracting is a compelling 
interest. 
4.  Narrow Tailoring for Affirmative Action Contracting Programs 
Once the government has demonstrated that its purpose or interest is 
constitutionally permissible and substantial, it must further demonstrate that its 
race-conscious measures are narrowly tailored.349  In DynaLantic, the court 
considered six narrow tailoring factors: 1) race-neutral means; 2) flexibility; 3) 
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over- and under-inclusiveness; 4) duration; 5) numerical proportionality; and 6) 
burden on third parties.350  This section will examine the applicability of these 
factors to the 8(a) program. 
Contracting officials accomplished much of the narrow tailoring for the 8(a) 
program by reviewing the aftermath of Adarand.351 Not surprisingly, the 
defining feature of the program is its flexibility.  The 8(a) program contains no 
quotas and imposes no penalties for failing to meet the program’s aspirational 
goals.352  Participants must complete a certification process prior to participating 
in the program.353  A contractor’s race is considered if he or she seeks eligibility 
in the program based on race.354  Alternatively, an applicant can demonstrate 
social disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence.355  Applicants must also 
show economic disadvantage to be eligible for the program.356 
The program has multiple features that limit the duration for individual 
participants.  Participation in the program is limited to nine years.357  Participants 
must annually submit a certification of eligibility, and the SBA must verify the 
participants’ eligibility on a continuing basis.358  Businesses that meet or exceed 
their business goals graduate early from the program.359  Once a business exits 
the program, whether through termination, graduation, or by some other means, 
that business and its owner or owners are no longer eligible to participate.360 
Notably, courts reviewing the 8(a) program have found that it is narrowly 
tailored on its face.361  However, no court has considered whether the program 
is narrowly tailored as applied to a specific industry because the program has not 
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survived scrutiny under the compelling interest prong in as-applied 
challenges.362 
Ultimately, the factors a court applies under narrow tailoring are dependent 
on the issues raised by the program.  In Grutter, Justice O’Connor stated: “[w]e 
have had no occasion to define the contours of the narrow tailoring inquiry with 
respect to race-conscious university admissions programs.  That inquiry must be 
calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student 
body diversity in public higher education.”363 
If the government articulated a diversity justification for 8(a), the narrow 
tailoring analysis would look similar to the analysis in DynaLantic, with the 
exception of the numerical proportionality factor.  In DynaLantic, the court 
compared the aspirational goal of the 8(a) program (i.e., three percent of prime 
and subcontract awards) to the pool of available minority businesses.364  It found 
that the program on its face was narrowly tailored because the percentage of 
eligible minority businesses was “not necessarily an absolute cap on the 
percentage that a remedial program . . . might legitimately seek to achieve.”365 
In the context of a non-remedial contracting program, numerical 
proportionality is not relevant.  In Fisher II, the Court stated that the 
“consideration of race in college admissions is not an interest in enrolling a 
certain number of minority students,” but an interest in “obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.’”366  Thus, the court 
did not require the university to specify a particular level of enrollment at which 
this objective would be achieved.367  Likewise, the consideration of race in 
government contracting is not an interest in awarding a certain number of 
contracts to minority-owned businesses, but an interest in obtaining the military 
benefits that flow from diversity in defense contracting. 
Narrow tailoring under Fisher II and Grutter II also considered whether the 
government engaged in a “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives.”368  In Fisher II, the Court examined historical data of racial 
diversity at the university to the extent it was relevant in revealing the success 
or failure of race-neutral alternatives.369  The 8(a) program has an exhaustive 
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record of failed race-neutral alternatives.370  Congress engaged in extensive 
studies examining the need for an affirmative action program prior to codifying 
the 8(a) program in 1978.371  This record is relevant to any as-applied analysis. 
Narrow tailoring depends on the facts and legal issues raised in each case.  
However, after Fisher II, the analysis is somewhat more predictable.  If the 
government raised the justification, and the 8(a) program survived the 
compelling interest prong, the program’s careful crafting and exhaustive 
legislative history would favor its survival under the narrow tailoring prong. 
5.  Challenges for the 8(a) Program 
The diversity rationale as it applies to higher education has garnered some 
criticism.  Critics argue that the rationale fails to “advance racial justice” and 
“legitimizes admissions policies that favor the privileged.”372  For example, 
critics argue that the diversity rationale ignores the underlying issues of racial 
hostility and bias.373  Whereas evidence-based studies and data that support 
remedial action shine a light on discrimination, the diversity justification glosses 
over the real problems and allows institutions to increase minority representation 
without addressing systemic racial issues.374 
This criticism ignores affirmative action jurisprudence that requires program 
officials to monitor the need for race-conscious programs.  Under Grutter, 
programs must be monitored and reviewed to ensure they are necessary.375  Such 
monitoring requires an awareness of discriminatory practices and their effects 
on institutions employing affirmative action programs.  If systemic issues are 
ignored, the need for the program cannot be established.  The criticism also 
ignores the challenges some institutions face in justifying remedial affirmative 
action programs with evidence-based studies.  Discrimination can be difficult to 
prove, even in populations with racial disparities.376  Institutions with limited 
resources may have difficulty conducting extensive race studies to support 
remedial programs, or may not have the expertise to conduct empirical race 
studies. 
In any case, statistical studies alone do not alleviate discrimination.  History 
has shown that such an undertaking requires the support of empowered 
community leaders in prominent positions, leaders that are produced by the 
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affirmative action programs at issue in this article.377  Programs like 8(a) and 
Texas’s Top Ten Program help create a diverse group of leaders that is capable 
and motivated to challenge systemic bias and that can make deep and impactful 
policy changes. 
The government contracting context offers some unique challenges to the 
application of the diversity justification.  For example, a number of contracts do 
not require military personnel and contractors to work in close proximity.  For 
example, a contract for radiology services may permit a doctor to review 
radiographs remotely without interacting with military personnel.  Contracts for 
goods, such as military uniforms, may require very little interaction between the 
manufacturer and military units.378  In these examples, military members and 
contractors work independently, so the diversity rationale carries less weight. 
But while contractors can sometimes support troops from afar, there is no 
doubt that the DOD often demands their physical presence.  The military 
requires a significant number of on-site service contractors to support operations 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at other bases and ports around the world.379  In fact, 
the DOD provides contract support to six unified combatant commands, 
including U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. African Command 
(AFRICOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM).380  The distribution of work performed under the DOD 
contracts in these locations differs from year to year.381  And, while not all goods 
and service contracts support the military on location, many of the military’s 
unique functions cannot be performed without close, on-site interaction.382 
It can be argued that the 8(a) program does not fulfill its minority business 
development objectives because the program only requires a showing that 
business owners are disadvantaged, not the firm’s employees.383  In other words, 
8(a) firms have little or no impact on diversity in the defense community because 
only the owners are minorities, not the employees.  This is essentially a critique 
of the narrow tailoring requirement for affirmative action programs. 
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As the Court stated in Fisher II, the relatively minor impact of the program is 
“a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of unconstitutionality.”384  The 
8(a) program accounted for less than five percent of DOD contracts for fiscal 
year 2015.385  Though relatively small, the program adds to the diversity of the 
defense contracting community.  That the program relies on the diversity of 
business owners rather their employees does not make the program ineffective.  
Though the program is small, there are opportunities for 8(a) firms to multiply 
their footprint.  For example, minority-owned firms may be more likely to hire 
minority employees due to the absence of discriminatory hiring practices.386  
Also, contracting regulations provide that 8(a) firms may be owned by groups 
of minorities rather than single owners.387  Group ownership can increase 
minority participation without necessarily expanding the program.  Finally, 
mentor-protégé programs allow 8(a) firms to partner with larger established 
firms to obtain management and technical assistance, investment and loan 
opportunities, and to cooperate in joint venture projects including subcontracts 
awarded by the mentor.388  These relationships expand the reach of minority 
firms by allowing them to participate in markets that they could not otherwise 
participate in as individuals. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The 8(a) program is a multi-billion dollar industry that offers tremendous 
benefits to minority businesses, from contracting to training opportunities.  Most 
importantly, the program leverages the diversity of our communities to augment 
our military forces. 
Critics argue that the program violates Equal Protection under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.389  Courts have denied facial challenges to the 
program, but have sustained challenges to the program as it applies to individual 
markets.390  As contractors continue to bring challenges against the program, its 
effectiveness will be significantly diminished.  Thus far, the courts have focused 
on whether the 8(a) program remedies past discrimination.  However, this is not 
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the only justification for affirmative action.  To the contrary, this year the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that diversity is a lawful objective for affirmative 
action programs. 
The military has made the case that diversity is critical to our national security.  
Diversity offers tangible strategic outcomes, including attracting and retaining 
talent, developing a multi-skilled force capable of performing global operations, 
maintaining good order and discipline, and fostering cultural competency in the 
leadership ranks.  In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized diversity outcomes 
in the military and business communities as “not theoretical but real.”391  It is a 
small step to imagine that diversity in the military contracting community offers 
the same real benefits. 
The new war-labor paradigm demands an equally diverse contracting 
workforce.  Today, contractors and military personnel share the battlespace.  The 
military’s strategic outcomes cannot be achieved without diversity across the 
total force.  By fostering diversity in the defense community, the 8(a) program 
helps maintain a level of private sector heterogeneity that advances the military’s 
strategic outcomes.  The benefits that flow from diversity in defense contracting 
are directly related to our national security posture.  Going forward, the 
government should advocate for the diversity rationale in justifying the 8(a) 
program.  Under this rationale, the 8(a) program achieves goals that are 





















                                                 
 391. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). 
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